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We use a new database covering 1.2 million active participants to study trading activities 
in 1,530 defined contribution retirement plans. Descriptive statistics and regression 
analysis indicate some interesting trading patterns. First, we show that trading activity in 
401(k) accounts is very limited: only 20% of participants ever reshuffled their portfolios 
in two years. Second, demographic characteristics are strongly associated with trading 
activities: traders are older, wealthier, more highly paid, male employees with longer plan 
tenure. Finally, we find that plan design factors, such as the number of funds offered, 
loan availability, and specific fund-families offered have significant impacts on 401(k) 
plan participants’ trading behavior. Moreover, on-line access channels stimulate 
participants to trade more frequently, although they do not increase turnover ratio as 
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1. Introduction 
Individually-managed 401(k) accounts are now the most widespread investment form for 
retirement saving in the U.S.  Currently, about one-third of all workers are enrolled in 401(k) 
plans, managing near $1.9 trillion in assets2 worth about 20% of the U.S nominal GDP.  Defined 
contribution schemes are also becoming more popular in other countries including Australia, 
Chile, Singapore, and Sweden where investment choices are offered to participants.  Japan 
passed its Defined contribution pension Act in Oct 2001, and Korea also started a DC plan 
scheme in December 2005. 
Although some theoretical financial research papers suggest that the individual trading 
behavior can influence the returns and volatility of the financial market (e.g. Bertola and Foresi 
1995, Odean 1998), little is known about how people actually invest their 401(k) plan assets.  
Further, there is nothing known about how their trading patterns might influence retirement 
outcomes.  Recent empirical research by Odean and his colleagues (Odean 1999; Barber and 
Odean 2000, 2001) provides evidence on trading activities and portfolio performance of 
individual investors, but these papers focus on the discount brokerage accounts, representing 
only a narrow and probably non representative subset of the universe of individual investors.  In 
addition, because discount brokerage account holders are those who presumably like to trade, it 
is necessary to pay attention to self-selection bias to interpret their results.  For defined 
contribution accounts, as far as we know, Agnew (2003) is the only empirical analysis focusing 
on the relationship between individual trading activities and their demographic characteristics in 
401(k) plans.  Consequently, nevertheless that it is necessary to confirm whatever previous 
results can be extended to other broader databases.  We also need to investigate whether other 
factors beyond demographics also drive participants to trade their pension portfolios. 
In this paper, we use an invaluable new dataset, provided by the Vanguard Group on 
more than 3 million 401(k) participants in over 2,000 plans, to illustrate how participant and plan 
characteristics shape trading behavior in individually-held voluntary retirement accounts.  We 
examine the patterns of trading in 401(k) plans, focusing on who trades, how often, what their 
                                                 
2 The latest estimate about 401(k) plans by Department of Labor is for plan year 1999, which was released in 
Summer 2004.  In 1999, there are 335,121 401(k) type plans covering 38.6 million active participants with $1,790 
billion in assets.  EBRI/ICI (Employee Benefit Research Institute/Investment Company Institute) estimates 401(k) 
plan universe held $1,885 billion in asset at year-end 2003. 
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turnover patterns are, as well as how plan design and other plan features influence their trading 
activities. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we review previous literature 
on individual investor trading patterns.  Section 3 describes the dataset.  Section 4 presents 
descriptive statistics regarding trading behavior.  In Section 5, we present our multivariate 
analysis methodology, hypotheses, and regression results.  Conclusions appear in Section 6. 
 
2. Previous Literature 
Although there is a substantial theoretical literature regarding individual portfolio trading 
behavior, most of it has not focused on investment patterns in defined contribution retirement 
accounts.  For instance, the conventional financial theory suggests that investors will trade when 
the marginal benefit of trading equals or exceeds the marginal cost (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).  
By contrast, overconfidence theory predicts that investors will trade to their detriment (Gervais 
and Odean, 2001).  Recently, Mitchell, Muermann, and Volkman (2004) have found that 
anticipated regret regarding investment outcomes prevents a regret-prone investor from making 
extreme portfolio allocations, which would make him more likely to rebalance his account as 
compared to a more conventional rational investor. 
To date, little empirical literature has explored trading patterns in retirement accounts, 
though there has been much research on interesting and unexpected patterns of trading in 
discount brokerage accounts.  A set of studies by Odean and his co-authors (Odean 1999; Barber 
and Odean 2000, 2001) supports the overconfidence theory more than rational expectations 
framework with the existence of transaction cost.  Using data on trading activities of 78,000 
discount brokerage accounts, they computed the transaction cost, defined as the sum of bid-ask 
spread and commission fees.  Comparing realized returns and the transaction costs, they provide 
evidence on trading behavior and investment performance of individual investors.  For an 
instance, they conclude that people tend to trade too much; trading behavior appears hazardous 
to investors’ portfolio performance (Barber and Odean, 2000); men appear to trade more than 
women because they are more overconfident (Barber and Odean, 2001). 
In addition, King and Leape (1987) examine the changes in portfolio composition over 
the life cycle from the transaction cost approach.  Using 1,978 Survey of Consumer Financial 
Decisions conducted by SRI (Stanford Research Institute), they studied the portfolio selection 
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problem of over 6,010 U.S. households.  They classify investment vehicles into “information-
intensive assets” such as individual equity and other assets, and then they report that the 
ownership of “information-intensive” assets increases even after controlling changes in wealth, 
marginal tax rate and household characteristics.  Therefore, the authors conclude that leaning and 
experience are important factors in lowering transaction costs overtime, leading to a positive 
relationship between investors’ ages and “information- intensive” portfolio selection.  
Empirical studies on trading in 401(k) plans are few in number, mainly because until now, 
analysts have not had good quality data on a wide variety of plan designs and participant 
outcomes. To our knowledge, Agnew et al (2003) focusing on a single large 401(k) plan is the 
only empirical work which explores participants’ trading patterns and their portfolio selection 
problem.  That analysis studied about 6,500 retirement accounts during April 1994-August 1998.  
At first, the authors examined the asset allocation and trading activities patterns using tabulations, 
and then they regressed equity allocation, turnover ratio and annual trade number on a set of 
demographic variables including age, sex, salary, marital status, and time in the plan.  In addition, 
Agnew et al. also track participants over time, which makes it possible to investigate how equity 
allocation and trading behavior change as individuals’ age and gain seniority on the job.  It also 
allows their study to model the dependent variables as a function of common time effect.  Finally, 
they conclude that most asset allocations are extreme (either 100% or 0%), and there is inertia in 
asset re-allocations; equity allocations are higher for males, married investors and for investors 
with higher earnings and more seniority on the job; equity allocations are lower for the elder 
people.  They find only limited portfolio reshuffling, in sharp contrast to discount brokerage 
accounts. 
Whether the results in Agnew et al. (2003) are generalizeable is in question.  For example, 
it would be useful to confirm whether their finding is specific to that single plan, or rather 
whether it is a general phenomenon across plans.  Moreover, when interpreting the common 
time-effect both on equity allocations and trading behavior, it is also necessary to take into 
account that before April 1994 (the beginning point of their database), participants were only 
able to invest in Guaranteed Investment Contracts (GICs).  In addition, we also need to 
investigate whether other factors beyond demographics can also influence individual trading 
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activities.3  In particula r, we seek to learn whether plan design is sharing participants’ trading 
behavior. 
As far as we know, our current investigation is the first comprehensive study on 401(k) 
trading activities across multiple plans.  It is distinguished from previous studies in 2 ways: First, 
we study a database of over 3 million DC retirement accounts across above 2,000 plans, which 
will enable us to examine a larger subset of the 401(k) universe.  Second, we can study trading 
patterns at the participant- level as a function of both participant and plan- level variables. 
    
3. Database and Descriptive Statistics 
 In this section, we describe our new database.  In Part A, we introduce the raw data and 
discuss its reprensentativeness.  Part B summarizes investment options, industry, and plan- level 
information.  Part C presents participant- level characteristics.  
 
A. The Vanguard Database 
This study uses a new database provided by the Vanguard Group (VG), contained 
information on more than 3 million DC plan accounts across 2,252 401(k) plans.  Those plans 
included 984 funds in the investment menu4 over the period Jan 2003 - Dec 2004.  This is 
hierarchical database that consists of 5 levels: time, industry, plan, participant and trade.  
At the industry level, the database codes every plan sponsor based on 4-digit NAIC5 
criteria, which have been aggregated into ten industries.6  
At the plan level, the plan files record the major plan design features such as the number 
of funds offered, employer company stock as an investment option, and loan availability.  In 
particular, this file enables us to figure out changes in investment menu for each plan, so we can 
evaluate the impact on participant level trading behavior.   
                                                 
3 An analysis of just two 401(k) plans by Choi, Laibson and Metrick (2002) evaluates only the impact of internet 
access to trading behavior at plan-level, but does not look at trading patterns and the impact on participant-level.  
Benartzi and Richard Thaler (2001) consider a cross-section of plans, rather than a cross-section of individuals and 
investigates how allocations at the plan-level change as a function of the investment menu in the plans. 
4 Actually, company stocks and cash are also for part of p lans, for convenience, we just call every available 
investment choice as “fund”.  
5 North American Industry Classification. 
6 1) Agricultural, Mining, or Construction, 2) Transportation, Communications or Utilities, 3) Manufacturing, 4) 
Media, Entertainment, Leisure, 5) Wholesale & Retail Trade, 6) FIRE - Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, 7) Business, 
Professional and Non-Profit Services, 8) Education & Health, 9) Government, 10) Unknown. 
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The participant level files give us each participant’s demographic characteristics and 
monthly balance amount as well as his portfolio allocations.  The trade level file records trade 
directions (e.g. sell company stock to buy Money Market Fund) and trade amounts.  In addition, 
we also obtained a separate file describing fund features such as fund classification (e.g. U.S 
equity, international equity or MMF). 
Compared to previous empirical studies, this database is far more representative of the 
401(k) covered population.  For example, if we take the EBRI/ICI database7 as a proxy of the 
401(k) universe, we can compare some plan and participant- level features available both for 
EBRI/ICI and the VG database (insert Table1). 
At the plan level, the total assets under management in the VG are over $146 billion at 
the end of 2003, around 20% of the EBRI/ICI amount.  But the EBRI/ICI database represents 
only about 41% of the total 401(k) plan assets, so we conclude the VG database represents about 
7% assets of the participant population.  For the account number, 2.5 million participants hold 
401(k) accounts in VG, one-sixth of EBRI/ICI data.  Almost of the plans in EBRI/ICI data have 
a few participants, wherever the average plan scale in the VG dataset is about 4 times larger for 
both total balances and accounts per plan.  It is interesting that at the participant level, the two 
datasets are very close in the terms of median in age, plan tenure and portfolio allocations. 
For the trading analysis, we eliminate some observations with.  At the plan level, we 
exclude three plan types of IRA, Deferred Compensation, and ESOP that do not fit into our 
401(k) focus.  At the participant level, we focus only on the accounts with continuous balance 
history (25 monthly balance records including Dec 2002) and continuous active plan status.8  We 
exclude non-active accounts because the trading activities of retired participants maybe differ 
from those of active workers; further, we need 25 monthly balance records to compute turnover 
ratios.  We also exclude some noise observations in the trade file such as the trades with only 
one-side record (only sale or only buy) or zero trade amounts. 
 
                                                 
7 Employee Benefits Research Institute / Investment Company Institute.  For further information about EBRI/ICI 
database, refer to “Perspective” Vol. 11 / No. 4A September 2005.  
8 For a discussion of plan status, refer to Appendix 1. 
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B. Investment Menu, Industry-level, and Plan Level Factors 
 After excluding inappropriate observations, our final sample size for the trading analysis 
is 1,186,554 accounts across 1,530 distinct 401(k) plans.  This subsection reports the 
characteristics of the plans investment menu, industry and plan design features. 
Over the sample period (Jan 2003 – Dec 2004), there are 691 unique funds ever selected 
as an investment option.  The Vanguard Group has classifies those funds into seven primary 
types as: 1) Balanced Funds, 2) Bond Funds, 3) Equity Funds, 4) Money Market Funds, 5) Other 
Funds, 6) Unfunded Funds, and 7) VG Brokerage Option, of which 5) and 6) are stable-value 
funds.  In addition, Equity Funds are categorized into five secondary types, which are 1) 
Aggressive Growth funds 2) Company Stock Funds, 3) Growth & Income Funds, 4) Growth 
Funds and 5) International Equity.  Money Market Funds are also divided into two types as 
Investment Contract Funds and Money Market Funds.  For convenience, we re-arrange all funds 
into three broader families defined as Equity, Fixed Income and Balanced Funds (the latter are 
hybrid investment vehicles with pre-determined target allocations in Equity and Fixed Income).  
Across the offered menu, almost 80% are equity funds and the other 20% are Fixed Income and 
Balanced Funds (insert Table 2). 
 Given the investment choice available in each plan, participants are allowed to alter their 
asset allocation patterns without any commission fees on a daily basis.  It is worth nothing that 
all participants in a given plan will be required to reallocate their assets from one specific fund to 
the other available options, if their plan sponsor decides to drop a given fund from the menu.  In 
this case, we call this type of trade as “Plan-wide trade”. 9  On the other hand, participants are 
never required to allocate any asset to newly-added funds. 
In Table 3 (insert Table 3), we summarize the industry leve l and plan- level characteristics 
of our sample.  On average, plans offered about 17 funds as of Jan 2003, of which 10 were equity 
funds, 4 fixed income funds, and 3 balanced funds.  There was a very wide range of plan design 
with 86 funds for maximum and one fund as minimum.  It is also interesting to document that the 
average participant only holds a positive balance in 3.5 funds.  In order to check whether menu 
change affects participants’ trading activities, we also check whether plans have ever changed 
their investment option.  Of the 1,530 plans, there were 513 plans which ever added new funds 
                                                 
9 For further definition of plan-wide trade, refer to Appendix 2. 
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and 121 plans ever dropped at least one fund, and the rest 896 never changed their investment 
options. 
 Turning to the investment menus offered, most plans offered indexed equity funds, and 
international equity funds were available for over 90% plans.  Although only in 15% plans (229) 
the employer company stock was a possible choice, because those plans are large, half of the 
participants could invest in their employer’s share.  In January 2003, about three quarters of the 
plans allowed participants to borrow from their DC retirement account, which covers 85% 
sampled participants. 
 We also review the distribution of life-cycle fund offering dummy.  Life-cycle funds, also 
called as “life-stage” or “target-date” funds provide a mechanism to automatically reduce the 
proportion of the portfolio held in equities as an investor ages.  In our sample, the Vanguard 
Group offers a set of “Target Retirement Funds”, each of which has a target retirement year 
(2005, 2015, …,  2045).  As the target year approaches, the investment management will 
gradually shift the funds from equities to bonds or MMF.  In practice, the allocation changes are 
not directly linked to any particular investor’s age, but those funds are marketed to those who 
plan to retire in time close to the target date of the fund.  The idea is that investors who do not 
want to or are unable to spend money and time to take care of their asset allocation, will more 
easily manage their retirement assets.  In our sample, there are 744 plans (49%) providing this 
kind of investment vehicle. 
 
C. Participant Characteristics 
 Next, we present descriptive statistics of participant level data.  Demographic 
characteristics of participants are shown in Panel A of Table 4 (insert Table 4).  The majority of 
our sample is male (47.5%), 26.7% of the accounts are held by females, and the reminder 
(25.8%) is coded as missing.  Compared with Agnew’s sample, our sample accounts show an 
older mean age (43.5 vs. 40.0 years old) with a wider range (our maximum is 83 years old and 
the minimum is 16).  Household income class (coded as 1, 2,…,11) is imputed by Claritas10 for 
2003 using participants ZIP code.  We converted these income classes into income levels using a 
lognormal distribution.  In 2003, the average household income is $88,000, somewhat higher 
                                                 
10 Claritas is a marketing information resources company which provides inome by ZIP code, for detail refer to 
http://www.claritas.com. 
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than Agnew et al. (2003)’s sample mean ($69,000).  For financial wealth, we use IXI Wealth 
class variables provided by IXI Corporation.11 and we convert it into mean dollars of each class.  
The sample mean value in 2003 was $75,000. 
 Panel B of Table 2 presents some interesting participant- level variables.  Employee 
Contribution Ratio, defined as the Employee-contributed Balance divided by the Total Balance, 
is important not only because it reflects the plan-match ratio, but also it expresses participants’ 
attitude towards contribution to their retirement accounts.12  In addition, it is also possible that 
attitudes toward “own money” and “house money” are different, which could affect participants 
trading behavior.  In January 2003, the mean of Employee Contribution Ratio is 57.5%, meaning 
that only 57.5% of the total balance of the average 401(k) account is contributed by the 
employee himself, his employer contributes the other 42.5%.  
On-line trading has been proposed as a cause of excessive trading, Metrick et al. (2002) 
and several previous studies show that internet trading channels increase individual investors’ 
trading frequency in discount brokerage accounts and 401(k) plans.13  We generate a web-access 
dummy variable, defined as equal to1 if a participant holds a web access to his account, and 0 
otherwise.  Some 37.4% of our sample accounts are able to do web trading. 
 
4. Evidence of Trading Activities 
 In this section, we provide the definitions regarding trading activities, present descriptive 
statistics, and then summarize some trading patterns. 
 
A. Measuring Trading Activities 
All trade orders issued by a 401(k) plan participant within the same day will be executed 
at the end price (3:00pm) for each fund.  Accordingly, we define a Trade as an asset allocation 
change in a day, which consists of both a sell record and a buy record of at least one fund and a 
positive trade amount become recorded.  For each trade, we compute the total sale/buy allocation 
                                                 
11 IXI is a private company which provides wealth measures by ZIP code, for detail, refer to http://www.ixicorp.com. 
12 This ratio might be different across accounts in a given plan. e.g, given 15% as the upper limit for total 
compensation, 6% as upper limit as employer contribution with 100% match ratio, a participant with 6% employee 
contribution has different Employee Contribution Ratio with a person with 9% employee contribution. 
13 As the example of empirical studies based on discount brokerage accounts, refer to Barber and Odean (2001), as a 
example of 401(k) plan studies, refer to Choi, Laibson and Metrick (2002). 
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change amount across all funds regarding this trade, and then we define the average of the sale 






















trdmt_out: total sale amount across all sold funds; 
trdmt_out_fndi: sale amount of fund i; 
n: number of sold funds; 
trdmt_in: total buy amount across all bought funds; 
trdmt_in_fndj: buy amount of fund j; 
m: number of bought funds; 
trdmt: trade amount 
If an individual investor ever exchanged his asset allocation at least once from January 
2003 to December 2004, then we define this participant as Trader, otherwise, we considered him 
as a Non-trader.   Each participant’s total trade times is defined as his Trade Number.  Because 
plan-wide trades are not due to investors’ choice but rather driven by the employer, we do not 
count those allocation changes as trades; therefore, if a participant only has plan-wide trades 
covering the sample period, we include him as a non-trader.  To measure trading magnitude, we 
use the Turnover Ratio.  This is defined as the ratio of total trades amount over participants 
sample average balance, defined as the average balance of sample beginning (December 2002) 




















__ =  
trdmt_smpl: total trade amount across total trades in sample period; 
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trdmtl: trade amount of trade l; 
k: total trade number in sample period; 
fndtotassetst: total assets in the end of period t; 
fndtotassets_avrg: average total assets; 
Ratio_turnover_smpl: turnover ratio. 
 
B. Plan-level Trading Activities 
Previous research suggests that offering a large number of funds provides diversification 
opportunities for knowledgeable participants.  Thus can lead to increase trading probabilities; on 
the other hand, too much variety in the investment menu may cause information overload 
problem (Agnew and Szykman, 2004): a lot of choices also potentially limit 401(k) participants’ 
trading activities. 
It is also possible to examine how investment package affects participants’ trading 
behavior from an efficiency perspective.  Given an efficient investment frontier, for example, 
maybe an indexed equity fund, a rational investor maybe only need to put his money in that fund, 
and he may not need to select individual assets to create his own efficient portfolio.   
As described in section 3, industrial recommendation of life-cycle funds suggests that this 
type of investment vehicle makes asset management easier.  Designed for one-stop investment 
shopping, life-cycle funds distribute investors’ money among various other funds, changing their 
asset allocation as they enter different life stages.  Of course, rational and engaged investors may 
find such kind of investment vehicles redundant.  However, for investors who may not know 
their risk tolerance, the overwhelming number of options may seem like more of a curse than a 
blessing, therefore, life-cycle funds can make portfolio selection problem easier: automatic 
adjustment mechanism makes them maintenance-free for investors. 
Another industrial story suggests that offering international funds provides international 
arbitrage opportunities, and thus, increase investors’ trading probabilities.  This may be 
particularly appealing to speculative transactions.  For example, if one expected the value of 
Japanese Yen to increase enough to cover transactions cost tomorrow in the eastern U.S. time 
zone, just buying tonight in Tokyo money market, and then selling tomorrow in N.Y. market, 
may the investor make money. 
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Table 5 presents our data on trading activities sorted by plan- level variables.  Clearly, 
plan design factors, as well as with participants’ financial literacy, are very important on 401(k) 
participants’ asset allocation behavior (insert Table 5). 
Our data shows evidence to support those theoretical implications.  For example, the 
plan-level trading propensity, which is defined as the ratio of trader to active participants per 
plan, has a hump shape associated with the number of funds offered.  It increases from 14.4% in 
plans offering 1-5 funds to 17.7% and 21.5% in groups with 6-10, and 11-17 investment choice 
respectively, and then hits its peak of 23.6% in plans with 18-30 funds.  Finally, it starts to 
decrease to 19.6% as a plan offers more than 30 funds.  This pattern may suggest that adding 
new funds to investment menu does increase participants’ trading probability due to more 
diversification opportunities, but this effect decreases marginally and there exists an upper bound. 
Trading propensity in plans offering international equity funds or employers’ company 
stock also is significantly higher than those plans without those types of investment choice.  
More than 20% of participants in an international equity available plan have ever reallocated 
their portfolios in our sample, which is 3.5% points higher than a plan lacking international 
equity funds.  Company stock availability also contributes to activate exchange activities: there is 
3.9% point spread of trading propensity between plans offering company stock and those not. 
There are no obvious different trading patterns between plans offering life-cycle funds, 
indexed equity funds, and loan availability with those plans that do not have those options.  In 
order to investigate if these variables influence participants’ trading activities significantly, we 
need to analyze our data using a multivariable approach. 
 
C. Participant-level Trading Activities 
 Table 6 presents the participant level trading activities, which are measured as 1) trading 
probability, 2) trade number, and 3) turnover ratio.  Only 20.5% of the 401(k) accounts ever 
altered their portfolio allocations over two-year, which indicates trading activities in individual-
managed retirement accounts are very limited.  This result is also consistent which the statistics 
in Agnew et al. (2003) single plan study, which showed about 88% participants have no trades.  
In our data, conditional on trading, the average sample turnover ratio reached almost 90%, which 
means on average a trader changed his asset allocations by 90% over two-year period (insert 
Table 6). 
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 Transaction cost theory tells us that investors will change their asset mix if when the 
marginal benefits from trading is no less than the marginal cost.  Given fixed transaction costs, it 
will be optimal for investors to relocate their assets infrequently with a discrete amount.  
Transaction costs could be classified into explicit and implicit costs.  The explicit costs are 
always expressed in a monetary form such as bid-ask spread, commission fees in case of 
common stocks or trustee fees in the case of mutual funds.  On the other hand, implicit costs may 
take the forms of opportunity costs such as time spent on information collection and information 
analysis.  Because trading is free for all of the sampled accounts, thus, in our case, implicit costs 
are supposed to be the only transaction cost.14 
 The implications of the transaction cost theory can also be captured by investors’ 
characteristics.  For instance, as King and Leape (1987) have argued, learning, experience and 
knowledge can lower the fixed transaction costs and thus lead to increase trading probability.  
This suggests that elder participants in knowledge- intensive industries ( e,g, Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate) are likely to reshuffle their portfolio more frequently with bigger magnitude.  
Meanwhile, longer plan tenure not only capture investors’ degree of knowledge on their plan and 
trading experience, and also indicate bigger balances, which will increase the likelihood of 
trading. 
 Table 6 presents the trading probability for each group sorted by participants’ 
demographic features.  We see that men are more likely to trade their assets significantly.  Nearly 
one quarter (24.1%) participants have ever changed their portfolio allocations over the two- year 
period, but only 17.9% among females.  These unbalanced trading probabilities are consistent 
with the overconfidence hypothesis and the empirical results in Barber and Odean (2001): men 
are more overconfident than women, so men are more likely to trade.  Of course, the sharp 
contrast between males and females could also be explained by the transaction cost framework15.  
That is females often have lower salary, smaller financial wealth and less investment literacy 
compared to men. 
 The trading probability increases as participants get older for almost all age ranges.  For 
investors under 35, only 16.9% participants have trading experience, in 36-45 years old group, 
this ratio goes up to 18.9%, and then it climbs 22.8% in 46-54 group,  and it finally hits its peak 
                                                 
14 Of course, there is no free lunch.  Ultimately, the transaction costs must be shared by mutual fund companies, plan 
sponsors, and participants in other forms. 
15 Refer to experiment study by Agnew (2004). 
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of 25.1% in 55-64 group.  This increasing trend fits the transaction cost theory described above, 
and the sharp decrease in trading among the over 65 years old group can also be rationalized: the 
portfolio allocation should have been exchanged to relative safe assets, thus reduce the 
motivation to rebalance their assets to safer options.  
 Trading probability has a monotonically increasing trend with participants’ plan tenure.  
The trading probability jumps from 17.4% in the participant group with less than 5 plan years, to 
31.7% for investors who have already stayed in the same plan over 25 years.  Obviously, this 
pattern is consistent with the theoretical implication as described above: the longer an investor 
stays in the same plan, the better he understands the plan, and the more experience/knowledge he 
has, which will increase his trading likelihood.  On the other hand, presumably, longer plan 
tenure also usually implies a bigger plan balance, which indicates possible substantial benefits 
from trading activities, thus motivates the investor to exchange his asset allocations. 
 Wealthier investors and participants with higher salaries are also more likely to trade.  
We categorized our participant level observations as low income/wealth group if household 
income/IXI wealth was under the sample median, and those who were above median as the high 
group.  The probability of investors in the high income group is 23.1% significantly, which is 
nearly 6% points higher than their low income counterparts.  People in the high wealth group are 
likely to relocate their assets with a probability near one-quarter, but the poor participants did 
less than one-fifth of the higher. 
Our finding is consistent with those results reported in previous studies: traders are older, 
wealthier, more highly paid, male employees, who have higher balance in their accounts.  People 
in the financial industry also trade more frequently than in other industries. 
Trade numbers are drawn from a very skewed distribution.  As shown in Table 7, 79.5% 
accounts have zero trade in two years.  Even among the traders, over half had only 1 trade.  
Roughly speaking, our 401(k) sampled participants altered their asset allocations 0.3 times in one 
year; that is to say they only trade once every 3.33 years on average.  However, there is another 
extreme group who are trading more than 50 times over 2 years (insert Table 7). 
Trade number patterns associated with participants’ demographic characteristics are 
similar to trading probability.  Males (0.75 trade/2 years) traded twice as frequently as female 
(0.36 trade/2 years), trade numbers increased with age until 65 years old, stayed in the same plan 
longer, earned more salary, and became wealthier.  Another interesting pattern is that the trade 
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numbers for participants with on- line accounts was 5.5 times (1.23 trades/ 2 years) higher than 
those lacking web access (0.22 trades/2 years).  Of course, participants might open their on- line 
accounts because they want to trade.  On the other hand, this sharp contrast still indicates that 
internet access availability does permit actual trading. 
Turnover ratios correlate with trade numbers.  On average, participants changed the 
composition of only 18% of their assets, but conditional on trading, the average turnover ratio for 
sample traders climbed to 89.7%.  When we sort turnover ratios by participants’ demographic 
characteristics, we confirm portfolio exchangers were likely to be men, older, high- income, 
wealthier, and had longer plan tenure investors compared their female, younger, low-income, 
lower wealth and shorter plan tenure counterparts.  However, on- line access did not increase the 
sample turnover ratio as dramatically as it did on trade numbers, maybe because internet 
channels only convince people to trade more frequently but reduce the trade amount per 
exchange compared with the case if they had traded with a conventional way.  This is also 
consistent with the empirical study results in Choi, Laibson and Metrick (2002), which is based 
on two large 401(k) plans plan level trading records.      
All of these statistics are consistent with the single plan examined by Agnew et al. (2003).  
We conclude that trading activity is extremely limited in 401(k) accounts.    
 
5. Regression Analysis 
This section summarized hypotheses to test, describes our regression methodology, 




Table 8 presents independent variables associated with the hypotheses we seek to test, 
and shows the predicted signs in the regression analysis (insert Table 8). We can summaries it as 
follows: 
1) Transaction Cost Hypotheses: Trading will be more prevalent among the people in 
financial literacy intensive industry like Finance, Insurance and Real Estate for industry 
level; older, highly paid, longer-tenured, wealthier, web-registered participants are more 
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likely to reshuffle their assets.  Offering life-cycle funds can make portfolio selection 
easier, thus, it would reduce trading propensity.   
2) Overconfidence hypothesis: Because men are more confident than women, trading will 
be more prevalent among males more than females. 
3) Diversification Hypothesis: the more funds offered at the plan level, the more likely 
people will trade; as international funds provide arbitrage opportunities, international 
funds may boost trading likelihood; offering company stock diversify the investment 
menu, thus increases the trading probability. 
4) Efficient investment frontier hypothesis: Assuming indexed funds span the efficient 
investment frontier, offering indexed funds will decrease investors’ trading patterns. 
5) Information Overload and Financial literacy Hypothesis: the information overload 
hypothesis proposes that more choice in the investment menu will reduce people’s 
trading; females are often low salary, less financial knowledgeable, thus, females trade 
less. 
   
B. Regression Methodology 
 For the regression analysis, we focus on three dependent variables: sample trader, trade 
number and turnover ratio. They measure the trading probabilities, trading frequency and trading 
magnitude, respectively. 
 We categorize the independent variables into three levels including five sub-classes: 
industry, plan, and participant levels.  We do not control on time because two year is not long 
enough to estimate time effects.  The specific independent variables are shown as below: 
1) Industry Level: Industry Dummy. We code nine dummy variables based on the VG 
classification with the reference industry being manufacturing. 
2) Plan Level: We divide plan- level explanatory variables into a) plan design features, and 
2) other plan level variables 
a. Plan design variables: Number of funds offered, its square, and the change during 
sample period.  Life-cycle funds dummy, International equity funds dummy, 
Company stock dummy, Indexed equity or/and fixed income funds dummy and 
loan availability dummy. 
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b. Other plan level variables: we adopt the natural log of the total plan assets as a 
proxy to measure scale economies. 
3) Participant level:  Participant- level independent variables are split into two sub-classes. 
a. Demographic characteristics: sex, age, plan tenure, household income and wealth 
as well as missing dummies for each variable. 
b. Other account- level features: On- line access dummy, employee-contribution ratio. 
The regressions use a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) framework.  The 
reason for Generalized Linear Model (GLM) part results from the features of our dependent 
variables: Sample traders is a binary variable (0,1), trading number is a non-negative integer, and 
turnover ratio is a non-negative real number.  The GLM relaxes the normality assumption 
required for a conventional regression model, and only requires the underlying distributions for 
dependent variables belong to the exponential family.16  In addition, by mixing or compounding 
two distributions, GLM also enables us to handle models with more complicate underlying 
distributions.17  
We also adopt a mixed error structure due to the hierarchical structure of our independent 
variables, which would generate serial correlation and heteroscadasticity problem.  The multi-
level regression approach provides extremely flexible variation for the error term structure, 
which enables us to test random effects, fixed effects and robust standard errors models. 
In our analysis, we use the following regression model: 
Linear Regression: mkimkmmmkmkimki wWZXy ,,,,,,
*
,, ''' ευδγβ +++++=    
Linear Predictor: ),,|( *,, WZXyE mki=µ  
Link Function: ( )µηη =  
where *,, mkiy  is the latent variable for individual i in plan k whose sponsor belongs to industry m,  
X , Z ,W  indicate participant level, plan level, and industry level explanatory variable vectors;   
β, γ, δ  are parameter vectors associated with X , Z ,W .  The error term consists of three parts: 1) 
a industry-variant term wm, 2) a plan-variant term υk,m, and 3) a disturbance term ε i,k,m.  Here, we 
control on industry-variant term wm by using industry dummies; we also assume that the plan is 
the independent analysis unit, allow serial correlation and heteroscadastity within the same plan, 
                                                 
16 Some usual examples are Gaussian, Inverse-Gaussian, Poisson, Gamma, and Binomial. 
17 It is well known that Negative Binomial is the mixture distribution of Poisson and Gamma distribution. 
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and then compute the cluster-robust standard error.18  Thus, the new error term can be re-
arranged as kikki ,, ευξ += , with  ),0(~
2
1, σε Nki  and ),0(~
2
2συ Nk , but the two terms are not 
necessary to be independent.  Therefore the re-arranged error structure may be written as19 
   Error structure: 0),( ,, =ljkiCov ξξ  for lk ≠  
0),( ,, ≠ljkiCov ξξ  for lk =  
 
C. Regression Results 
1) Sample Trader 
With the GLMM approach, we can rewrite our regression function for Sample Trader 
according to a usual Probit regression model: 
mkimkimki WZXy ,,
*
,, ''' ξδγβ +++=    
),,|( *,, WZXyE mki=µ  
( )µη 1−Φ= , where Φ−1 is the inverse CDF of Normal Distribution 
Table 9 presents the regression results.  The estimator indicates a very high joint 
significance of the independent variables.  The pseudo-R2 is 10.9% and the concordant percent is 
72.7%, which implies the specification validity of the whole model.  Compared a model that 
include only demographic factors as in Agnew et al. (2003), our current model also shows a 
significant advantage.  This evident in the absolute difference of the likelihood ratio between the 
two models, but it also appears in the improvement of pseudo-R2 and concordant percent, which 
increase 8.4% points (10.9%-2.5%=8.4%) and 12.0% (72.7%-60.7%=12.0%) respectively (insert 
Table 9). 
Our most remarkable finding is that most of the plan level variables affect investors’ 
trading likelihood significantly.  Trading probability rises as the number of funds offered grows 
as well as the number of fund changes.  However, the sign of the square of number of funds 
offered is negative.  From the marginal effects regarding the number of funds and number of 
                                                 
18 Monte Carlo simulation results suggest the biggest cluster should not larger than 5% of total observations.  In our 
case, 59,350 participants are enrolled in the largest plan, which is just 5% (59350/1186554=5%).  
19 Theoretically, it is also possible to build mult i-level regression with multiple random effects: industry and plan.  
However, those computation tasks are beyond a usual computer capacity even using the most time-efficient 
optimization technique. 
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funds squared (+0.000561 vs. -0.00005), we can easily calculate the positive effects reach its 
peak at the 54th fund.  This fact suggests that our results support the diversification hypotheses: 
adding new funds to the investment menu does stimulate participants to alter their portfolio 
allocations, although this effect diminishes as the total number of funds offered grows. 
Offering a loan makes investors less much to change their asset mix with marginal effect 
of 2.2%.  On the other hand, company stock availability encourages participants to change their 
portfolios.  Meanwhile, investors do make their trading decisions depending on whether their 
plan sponsors offer an indexed equity fund.  Controlling on other factors, a 401(k) plan 
participant is 44% less likely to trade if his plan offers an indexed equity fund, compared to a 
plan lacking such a fund. 
We also find that offering Life-cycle funds reduces investors’ trading probability because 
of its automatic risk adjustment mechanism, and an international equity fund encourages 
participants to change their asset allocations by 3.7% due to the potential international arbitrage 
opportunities. 
Participant level independent variables confirm to those regarded in previous studies.  
Demographic characteristics such as sex, age, and plan tenure positively correlate with 
investors’ trading probability with consistent learning and experience hypotheses.  Ten more 
years of age boosts the trading probability by 2.1%; ten more years of plan tenure arises it by 3%.  
Men alter their 401(k) portfolio composition 4.65% more than females.  
Household income and financial wealth also significantly affect investors’ trading 
probability.  A 1% increase in household income raises people’s trading probability by 2.9%, and 
the increase in the ratio of financial assets over household income also correlates positively with 
trading probability. 
2) Trade Number 
In the regression function for trade number, we assume the dependent variable is drawn 
from Poisson distribution, and the parameter of Poisson distribution is from a Gamma 
distribution.  As a result, the trade number is assumed to be distributed as Negative Binomial, 
which is the mixture of Poisson and Gamma.  In GLMM estimation, we use a log link function. 
In fact, we can interpret those statistical procedures as a method to capture individual 
heterogeneity in an econometric model. 
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If we add another individual heterogeneity term ζ into the error, a usual Poisson 
Regression with cross- individual heterogeneity could be written as: 
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Integrating respect to ui,  it is easy to get the closed form as the following, which is the familiar 
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 In our regression function, we need to estimate parameter vectors, β,γ,δ in the Poisson 
part, and θ, the parameter in the Gamma part, which is also called overdispersion parameter. 
 Table 10 presents the estimator results.  As before with the trade propensity function, our 
independent variables work significantly well to explain the dependent variable (insert Table 10).   
 For the plan- level variables, offering company stock and international equity funds are 
the main plan design features that stimulate participants to trade more frequently; these increase 
trade number by 23% and 17% respectively.  Offering more funds significantly encourages 
investors to exchange more frequently, but the magnitude of the effect is relatively small (one 
more fund offered causes 1.1% rise in trade number). 
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 Demographic characteristics also return their explanatory power to interpret individual 
investors’ trading number as appeared in trade propensity function.  Again, male, higher paid, 
richer, and longer plan tenured participants trade more frequently than their counterparts.  
Another interesting result is that individual on- line access motivates investors to exchange their 
asset mixture significantly more and with a very high magnitude. 
 In addition, the overdispersion parameter is estimated to be 4.78, which is significantly 
not equal to zero and suggests individual heterogeneity can not be captured by demographic 
characteristics alone. 
3) Sample Turnover Ratio 
 Table 11 presents a Heckman second-stage OLS regression results for the turnover ratio.  
We adopt the Heckman second-stage regression rather than a conventional censored regression 
method because we want to explicitly decompose the explanatory power of independent 
variables into two parts: the indirect effects through trading probability, and the direct effects 
conditional on trading (insert Table 11). 
 The coefficient regarding the inverse Mills ratio from the 1st-stage Probit regression, is 
estimated to be 0.75, which suggests all of the independent variables jointly explain the turnover 
ratio indirectly through increasing trading probability. 
 At the plan- level, offering international equity funds and offering indexed equity funds 
are still correlated the turnover ratio as seen in the trading propensity and the trade number 
functions.  However, the number of funds offered and its square changed their signs suggesting 
that traders tend to exchange their 401(k) assets a subset of funds, and do not intend to extend 
their portfolio variety.  
 
D. Implication 
 So far, we have followed the analysis framework of Agnew et al. (2003) by investigating 
the trading patterns in 401(k) retirement accounts.  We confirm the fact that the trading activity 
in 401(k) retirement accounts is extremely limited: only 20% participants ever altered their 
portfolios within a two year period.  Demographics hence can explain trading patterns in the 
ways that supports the theoretical implications. 
 However, our analysis is distinguished with previous studies in several points. 
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 First, we find that plan design can explain trading behavior.  Offering indexed funds and 
loans significantly reduces participants trading, while offering international equity funds and 
employer’ company stock gives investors more motivation to trade assets.  The more funds the 
plan sponsor offers, the more actively participants trade, but that effect increases at a decreasing 
rate. 
 Second, instead of conventional Tobit regression, we use Heckman 2-stage regression 
method for sample turnover ratio analysis.  Therefore, we explicitly show the direct and indirect 
effect from the same independent variable.  For example, even controlling on traders ( i.e. 
controlling on the indirect effects through trading probability), plan design still retain its 
significant power to explain the traders’ turnover ratio. 
 It is easy to obtain the intuitive implications for plan sponsors and participants from our 
finding.  Table 12 summarizes the marginal effects on 401(k) participants’ trading behavior 
(insert Table 12). 
 As described above, although there is no any explicit transaction fee for trading 401(k) 
portfolios, ultimately, the transaction costs must be shared by mutual fund companies, plan 
sponsors, and participants in other forms.  Therefore, the inertia trading activity in 401(k) 
accounts directly indicates cost saving for the plan sponsor if it shares part of the transaction 
costs.  However, it is not clear whether the limit trading behavior is positive or negative for 
participants before examine the trading performance: maybe limit trading make investors pass 
over some better investment opportunities, it is also possible that limit trading protects investors 
from rather worse investment outcome. 
 On the other hands, it may be necessary to take into account the impact on participants’ 
trading activity from the plan design factors when an employer designs its’ 401(k) plan.  For 
example, the most efficient way to minimize the trading probability, the number of trading, and 
the turnover ratio is to offer an indexed equity fund.  In fact, more than 95% of our sampled 
plans hold at least one such fund in the investment menu.  Meanwhile, offering international 
equity funds, employer company stock, and brokerage options is the effective way to diversify 
the investment options, and thus attract the participants.  In order to control the trading 
probability to a pre-determined target, offering life-cycle funds can offset the positive 
diversification effects by adding 13 new funds to the investment menu.  
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 Furthermore, significant explanatory power of participants’ characteristics also requires the 
plan sponsors to pay attention to the demographic structure of the participants.  For example, in 
an extreme case, compared to a 100% female company, a 100% male company needs to offer 
loan availability and life-cycle funds to balance out the overconfident effects of men. 
 Overall, our analysis provides the evidence that both participants and plan sponsors need to 
be aware of the behavior of opposite part.  An employee seeking to maximize his net 401(k) 
saving needs to pay attention to the plan design features, because they significantly affect 
participants’ trading behavior, and then their investment performance;  an employer as fiduciary 
also need to take into account the impact on participants’ trading behavior when it designs its 
401(k) retirement plan.       
  
6. Conclusion 
 Our analysis of 1.2 million 401(k) plan participants shows relatively little overall trading in 
DC retirement plans, with substantial heterogeneity. 
 We find that only 20% participants ever reshuffled their portfolios over a two-year period, 
indeed, most of the people never trade.  Even when people do trade, it is rare and over half 
traders only trade once.  Like previous studies, we find demographic characteristics can 
significantly explain trading activity: traders are older, wealthier, more highly paid, male 
employees with more money in their accounts.  We also find plan design factors do have 
significant impact on 401(k) plan participants’ trading behavior: participants trade more in plans 
with more investment choice, company stock, and international equity funds, and offering 
indexed funds, life-cycle funds, and loan availability reduce people’s portfolio turnover. Finally, 
on- line access stimulates participants to trade more frequently, although they do not increase 
turnover ratio as much. 
 Our analysis also shows that trading activities in 401(k) plans differs from those in discount 
brokerage accounts.  Compared to the results of Odean and his co-authors, individual investors 
seem likely to trade their asset through discount brokerage account rather than retirement saving: 
investors trade 1.44 times annually in the discount brokerage accounts but only trade 0.30 time in 
the 401(k) accounts.  This sharp contrast maybe comes from 1) self-selection problem in 
discount brokerage accounts, and 2) limited choice in investment menu. 
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 Maybe one possible direction for future research is to check the relationship between 401(k) 
trading and portfolio returns.  In our analysis, we only use the characteristics of participants, 
plans, and industries, as independent variables, and we do not take into account the market 
environment.  By computing how trading influence investors’ portfolio performance, maybe we 
would deepen our understanding of the trading behavior in 401(k) plans. 
 Another reason for the inertia trading activity of 401(k) accounts perhaps comes from the 
efficiency problem of investment options.  Financial economics theory teaches us that a rational 
investor will always rebalance their assets in order to allocate their portfolio in the efficient 
frontier associated with their utility functions with the competitive market assumption.  However, 
in the 401(k) context, the investment menu offered by plan sponsors may not span the efficient 
frontier20; consequently, the potential inefficiency may have an impact on trading activity. 
 It deserves to note that our analysis only covers a short sample period of 2003-3004, which 
was an extremely bullish period for the U.S stock market.  We need to extend the trading sample 
including the future period.  Ideally, we want to include bearish market environment and check 
the robustness of the result in this paper. 
 Finally, in the future research, we plan to make a more detailed time-series approach to 
extend our future analysis.  In particular, given the crucial role of the plan design features in 
participants’ trading behavior, we need to evaluate how the plan design change influences 
employees’ portfolio selection and investment performance in their retirement saving account, 
and therefore provides the policy implications to fund managers, record keepers, plan sponsors 
and policy makers.     
 
 
                                                 
20 For example, Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber, and Christopher R. Blake (2002) find about 62% 401(k) plans do 
not offer adequate investment choice. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Comparison Data
VG1 EBRI/ICI2 Comparison
(A) (B) (A/B) (A-B)
Panel A: Selected Plan Features
Total Plans 1,942 45,152 4.3%
Total Accounts 2,525,268 15,047,358 16.8%4
Total Assets ($ million) 146,944 775,984 18.9%
Accounts per Plan 1,300 333 390%
Assets per Plan ($ million) 76 17 440%
Panel B: Selected Participant Features
Age (median, year) 44.2 44 0.2
Plan Tenure (median, year) 8.7 7.0 1.7
Assets per Account ($) 58,189 51,569 113%
  Balanced Funds (%) 12.9% 9.5% 3.4%
  Fixed Income Funds3 (%) 26.1% 27.4% -1.3%
  Equity Funds (%) 60.8% 61.0% -0.2%
1.VG: Vanguard Group
2.EBRI/ICI: Employee Benefit Research Institute/Investment Company Institute
3.Fixed Income Funds=Bond Funds+Money Market Funds+Guaranteed Investment
Contracts (GICs)+Other Stable Value Funds
4.EBRI database represents 41% of the total 401(k) plan assets, which is about $1.9 trillion. 
Therefore, VG database represents about 6.9% of the universe.
All of the numbers are as December 2003.
Source: the Vanguard Group, "Perspective" Vol. 11 No. 4A, EBRI/ICI September 2005   
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Table 2: Investment Menu and Fund Families
Fund Family Number of funds (%) Allocation as Jan 03
Balanced Funds 43 6.22 12.95
Balanced funds 42 6.08 12.81
Brokerage option 1 0.14 0.13
Fixed Income Funds 100 14.47 31.05
Bond funds 40 5.79 9.27
Money Market Funds 57 8.25 21.78
Investment contract funds 52 7.53 14.52
Money market funds 5 0.72 7.25
Unfunded funds 3 0.43 0.00
Equity Funds 548 79.31 56.00
Aggressive growth funds 58 8.39 3.08
Company stock funds 193 27.93 15.08
Growth and income funds 66 9.55 24.06
Growth funds 167 24.17 11.33
International equity funds 64 9.26 2.46
Total 691 100.00 100.00
Fund number is the number of funds ever selected as an investment option.   
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Table 3: Plan Features
Mean Std Min Max
Offer Investment Menu
Number of funds 16.59 12.93 1.00 86.00
Balanced Funds 2.99 2.29 0.00 11.00
Equity Funds1 9.84 8.12 0.00 59.00
Fixed Income Funds2 3.77 3.52 0.00 19.00
Offers Life-Cycle Funds (yes=1) 48.8%
Offers International Equity Funds (1=yes) 93.1%
Offers Index Equity Fund (1=yes) 98.8%




Total Assets per Plan (Million $) 38 146 0 3,624
Active Account Number per plan 776 2,503 1 59,350
1.Observation number: 1,530 plans.
2. Equity Funds=Equity Funds+International, and company stocks are included in Equity Funds.
3. Fixed Income Funds=Bond+Money Market Fund (MMF)+Investment Contracts (IC)
    +other stable value funds.
4. As of January 2003.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of 401(k) Account Holders
Mean Std Min Max
Panel A: Demographic Features 





Plan Tenure (years) 7.95 6.76 0.00 56.84
Household Income ('000$) 88 60 8 254
IXI Wealth ('000$) 75 196 -52 2,172
Panel B: Account Features
# of Selected Funds 3.48 2.22 1.00 49.00
57.5% 30.4% 0.0% 100.0%
Web Access (1=Yes, 0=No) 37.4%
Account Balance ('000 $) 86 136 0 17,825
1. Ratio of the balance attributable to employee contribution to the total balance
2. Sample size=1,186,554.
Ratio of Employee Contribution 1
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Table 5: Plan-level Trading Activity
Trading Propensity1 Trade Number Turnover Ratio2
Mean (%) Std (%) Mean Std Mean (%) Std (%)
All 20.51 40.38 0.60 2.67 89.68 236.13 1,530 1,186,554
Number of Funds Offered
1-5 14.39 23.91 0.40 2.03 62.89 83.97 17 3,963
6-10 17.68 11.35 0.50 2.29 90.08 225.47 478 282,776
11-17 21.48 13.65 0.62 2.78 95.16 273.13 675 572,404
18-30 23.61 13.13 0.55 2.36 79.20 161.71 221 207,918
Over 30 19.63 9.91 0.82 3.40 81.62 172.11 139 119,493
Offers Life-cycle Funds
No 20.36 13.40 0.60 2.58 86.15 216.31 783 631,769
Yes 20.35 12.39 0.60 2.77 93.79 257.22 747 554,785
Offers International Equity Funds
No 17.10 14.05 0.43 1.97 77.73 202.22 105 24,711
Yes 20.59 12.80 0.60 2.68 89.88 236.65 1,425 1,161,843
Offers Indexed Equity Funds
No 51.13 49.99 0.72 1.36 106.53 67.72 19 7,311
Yes 20.32 40.24 0.60 2.68 89.42 237.81 1,511 1,179,243
Loan Available
No 18.86 15.57 0.45 2.10 86.10 162.56 393 181,023
Yes 20.87 11.82 0.63 2.76 90.24 245.54 1,137 1,005,531
Offers Company Stock
No 19.77 13.01 0.46 2.10 87.48 190.56 1,301 565,340
Yes 23.66 11.88 0.72 3.10 91.28 264.35 229 621,214
Offers Brokerage Option
No 19.91 39.93 0.56 2.56 90.24 238.41 1,483 1,132,716
Yes 33.30 47.13 1.32 4.35 82.67 205.20 47 53,838








Table 6: Participant-level Trading Activities
Trading Probability Trade Number Turnover Ratio1
Mean (%) Std (%) Mean Std Mean (%) Std (%)
All 20.51 40.38 0.60 2.67 89.68 236.13 1,186,554 243,398
Age
Under 35 years old 16.53 37.15 0.40 1.81 78.33 194.86 245,130 40,531
35-44 years old 18.94 39.19 0.53 2.48 88.59 240.42 378,687 71,740
45-54 years old 22.77 41.93 0.72 3.11 94.03 252.38 395,125 89,966
55-64 years old 25.06 43.34 0.78 3.04 93.80 232.45 155,869 39,061
Over 65 years old 17.88 38.32 0.47 1.82 83.15 132.75 11,743 2,100
Plan Tenure
Under 5 years 17.39 37.90 0.45 2.11 85.13 196.69 522,620 90,877
5-14 years 20.76 40.56 0.59 2.58 89.37 226.06 488,796 101,477
15-24 years 28.59 45.18 1.03 3.89 95.94 291.11 143,730 41,086
Over 25 years 31.71 46.53 1.25 4.66 108.58 372.44 31,408 9,958
Sex
Male 24.07 42.75 0.75 3.06 96.09 263.63 563,647 135,673
Female 16.09 36.74 0.36 1.74 70.41 150.51 316,821 50,980
Missing 18.54 38.86 0.56 2.69 91.67 228.49 306,086 56,745
Household Income2
Low Group 17.43 37.94 0.48 2.36 91.75 260.04 538,829 93,914
Highgroup 23.08 42.13 0.70 2.90 88.38 219.77 647,725 149,484
IXI Wealth3 
Low Group 17.04 37.60 0.48 2.31 94.43 252.92 592,204 100,904
Highgroup 23.97 42.69 0.72 2.99 86.32 223.42 594,350 142,494
On-line available
No 11.55 31.96 0.22 1.28 78.14 190.61 743,114 85,804
Yes 35.54 47.86 1.23 3.97 95.97 257.34 443,440 157,594
1. Conditional on trading.
2. If the household income is less than the median of the sample, then define it as in low group
other wise define it as high group, and the median household income is $86,319.
3. If the IXI wealth is less than the median of the sample, then define it as low group, otherwise,
define it as in high group, and the median is $35,735.








Table 7: Distribution of Number of Trades per Account






Over 100 0.0% 60
Note: exclude plan-wide trades.   
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Table 8: Theoretical Preditors
Theoretical Predictor Trading Propensity Trade number Turnover Ratio1
Transaction Cost
Age + + +
Plan tenure + + +
Household income + + +
Wealth + + +
Offering Life-cycle funds - - -
Offering Loan Availibility - - -
On-line Availibility + + ?
Overconfident Theroy
Male + + +
Diversification
Number of funds offered + + ?
Square of number of funds offered - - ?
Change of number of funds offered + + ?
Offering company stock + + +
Offering international funds + + +
Offering brokerage option + + +
Efficient investment menu
Indexed equity fund - - -
Overload information and financial literacy
Number of funds offered - - ?
Square of number of funds offered + + ?
Change of number of funds offered - - ?
Male2 + + +
Household income3 + + +
1: conditional on trader.
2,3: as proxies of financial literacy.   
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Table 9: Multivariate Robust Analysis of the Probability of Trading
Dependent Variable: Trader (1=trader, 0=non-trader, mean=20.5%)
Demographics Only Full Model
Estimate t-value Marginal Estimate t-value Marginal
Demographic Variables
Age 43.48 0.004 24.68 0.0010 0.008 50.35 0.0021
Plan tenure 7.95 0.016 79.56 0.0045 0.011 52.43 0.0030
Male (1=yes, 0=no) 0.48 0.263 80.31 0.0739 0.177 49.25 0.0465
Log(household income) 11.17 0.175 85.20 0.0490 0.112 51.35 0.0293
IXI wealth / household income 0.92 0.011 11.01 0.0032 0.009 12.82 0.0023
Other Account Variables
Web available (1=yes, 0=no) 0.37 0.798 280.56 0.2264
Employee contribution ratio 0.57 0.207 42.430 0.0543
Plan Design Variables
Number of funds offered 17.72 0.00214 3.57 0.000561
Number of funds squared 495.11 -0.00002 -2.59 -0.000005
Number of funds changed 0.65 0.001 2.06 0.0002
Offers life-cycle funds 0.47 -0.030 -8.54 -0.0079
Offers indexed equity funds 0.99 -1.215 -66.38 -0.4369
Offers international funds 0.98 0.152 13.18 0.0371
Loan available (1=yes) 0.85 -0.083 -14.61 -0.0222
Offers complany stock 0.52 0.100 27.99 0.0262
Offers brokerage option 0.05 0.181 24.98 0.0509
Log(plan assets) 18.75 -0.011 -10.15 -0.00277
intercept -3.2437 -137.78 -1.8392 -52.44
Obs 1,186,554 1,186,554
Concordant Percentage 60.7% 72.7%
Pseudo R2 2.5% 10.7%
-2log(L) 1,174,334 1,075,240
Model Comparison (∆2log(L) vs Criteria χ2 ) 99,094>12.34
Note: Missing dummies included for all explanotary variables. We also control on industry dummies.
All variables are as of Jan 2003.
Standard errors are cluster-corrected robust.





Table 10: Multivariate Robust Analysis of the Number of Trades
Dependent Variable: Total trade number (mean=0.60)
Only Demographic Model Full Model
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Demographic Variables
Age 43.48 0.009 9.86 0.016 14.75
Plan tenure 7.95 0.036 26.61 0.024 14.41
Male (1=yes, 0=no) 0.48 0.689 31.26 0.472 17.43
Log(household income) 11.17 0.280 19.17 0.161 9.31
IXI wealth / household income 0.92 0.036 22.80 0.021 12.45
Other Account Variables
Web available (1=yes, 0=no) 0.37 1.638 75.51
Employee contribution ratio 0.57 0.332 9.30
Plan Design Variables
Number of funds offered 17.72 0.01099 2.64
Number of funds squared 495.11 -0.00009 -1.62
Number of funds changed 0.65 0.006 2.14
Offers life-cycle funds 0.47 -0.031 -1.24
Offers indexed equity funds 0.99 -1.328 -20.52
Offers international funds 0.98 0.173 2.05
Loan available (1=yes) 0.85 -0.117 -2.84
Offers complany stock 0.52 0.230 8.78
Offers brokerage option 0.05 0.309 6.02
Log(plan assets) 18.75 0.000 -0.02
Scale 6.878 4.787
intercept -4.907 -29.62 -3.688 -15.40
Obs 1,186,554 1,186,554
Pseudo R2 1.5% 6.6%
-2log(L) 2,018,282 1,914,053
Model Comparison (∆2log(L) vs Criteria χ2 ) 104,229>12.34
Note: Missing dummies included for all explanotary variables. We also control on industry dummies.
All variables are as of Jan 2003.
Standard errors are cluster-corrected robust.





Table 11: Second Stage in Two-stage Multivariate Robust Analysis of the Turnover Ratio
Dependent Variable: Turnover Ratio 1 (mean=89.3%)
Demographics Only Full Model
estimate t-value estimate t-value
Demographic Variables
Age 0.0038 7.81 0.0096 6.14
Plan tenure 0.0023 2.53 0.0092 4.11
Male (1=yes, 0=no) 0.2036 20.68 0.3149 9.48
Log(household income) -0.0832 -10.10 0.0036 0.16
IXI wealth / household income -0.0069 -6.50 -0.0003 -0.18
Other Account Variables
Web available (1=yes, 0=no) 0.6535 4.43
Employee contribution ratio -0.0102 -0.24
Plan Design Variables
Number of funds offered -0.0073 -4.72
Number of funds squared 0.0001 4.11
Number of funds changed 0.0076 5.46
Offers life-cycle funds 0.1036 8.29
Offers indexed equity funds -0.7247 -3.36
Offers international funds 0.1517 3.36
Loan available (1=yes) -0.0054 -0.24
Offers complany stock -0.0161 -0.72
Offers brokerage option 0.0721 1.86
Log(plan assets) 0.0322 8.02
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.2461 -18.11 0.7548 3.16
intercept 1.7961 18.09 -1.1277 -2.10
Obs 243,398 243,398
Pseudo R2 0.02% 0.1%
-2log(L) 1,108,154 1,107,619
Model Comparison (∆2log(L) vs Criteria χ2 ) 535>12.34
1.Conditional on traders.
Note: Missing dummies included for all explanotary variables. We also control on industry dummies.
All variables are as of Jan 2003.
Standard errors are cluster-corrected robust.
Shadow area indicates not significant with 95% confident interval.   
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Age 0.21% 1.63% 0.96%
Plan tenure 0.30% 2.38% 0.92%
Male (1=yes, 0=no) 4.65% 47.24% 31.49%
Log(household income) 2.93% 16.14% 0.36%
IXI wealth / household income 0.23% 2.09% -0.03%
Other Account Variables
Web available (1=yes, 0=no) 22.64% 163.76% 65.35%
Employee contribution ratio 5.43% 33.18% -1.02%
Plan Design Variables
Number of funds offered 0.06% 1.10% -0.73%
Number of funds squared -0.001% -0.01% 0.01%
Number of funds changed 0.02% 0.64% 0.76%
Offers life-cycle funds -0.79% -3.14% 10.36%
Offers indexed equity funds -43.69% -132.83% -72.47%
Offers international funds 3.71% 17.25% 15.17%
Loan available (1=yes) -2.22% -11.65% -0.54%
Offers complany stock 2.62% 23.03% -1.61%
Offers brokerage option 5.09% 30.86% 7.21%
1.Marginal effects are computed at the mean values of the independent variables.
2.Marginal effects indicate percentage change of the number of trades caused by one unit
change in independent variables
3.Conditional on traders.
Shadow area indicates not significant with 95% confident interval.
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Appendix 1: Plan Status Identification 
We identified participants’ plan status with their contribution records.  The basic idea is if 
an employee (EE) or his/her employer (ER) is contributing to his/her 401(k) account in a given 
month, then we define his/her plan status as active.  If an employee is active for the whole 
sample period, then we define him/her as sample active, and we focus the observations with 
sample active plan status. 
Because it is impossible to identify the ACCURATE contribution schedule for each 
account, we identified the plan status with the following decision rule. 
 
Ø Step 1: Categorize plans into 3 types by plan- level sample total contribution amount. 
o If the plan- level total employee-contribution amount in sampled 2 years is equal 
to zero, and plan-level total employer-contribution amount is greater than zero, 
then define this plan as ’ER only’ type. 
o If the plan- level total employer-contribution amount in sampled 2 years is equal to 
zero, and plan- level total employee-contribution amount is greater than zero, then 
define this plan as ’EE only’ type. 
o If both the plan- level total employer-contribution amount and plan- level total 
employee-contribution amount in sampled 2 years are greater than zero, then 
define this plan as ’EE and ER’ type. 
Ø Step 2: Define an account as “Active in a given month” according to the following rule: 
o Case 1: The plan is an ER-only contribution plan.  
àRULE: A given account is classified as active in that month if that account has 
any ER contribution within a plus/minus 12-month window, otherwise defines it 
as inactive. 
o Case 2: The plan is an EE-only contribution plan.   
àRULE: An account is active that month if the account has a positive EE 
contribution in that month, otherwise define it as inactive. 
o Case 3: The plan has both EE and ER contributions.   
à In this case, an account is active that month if the account has positive EE 
contribution; 
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àELSE, for each account, compute EE contribution frequency over all months to 
ascertain whether the EE contribution has been positive at any time in the last 6 
months.  
àTHEN consider 2 cases as follows 
♦ An account is active there is no any EE contribution in all months, but has 
some positive ER contribution within plus/minus 12-month window, 
otherwise define it as inactive. 
♦ An account is active if there is some positive EE contribution in any of last 
6 months, otherwise define it as inactive. 
Ø  Step 3: Define an account to be “Continuously Active” if and only if it is active in all of 
the months from Jan 2003-Dec 2004.  This is the group we would focus on in our trading 
analysis. 
 
Appendix 2: Plan-wide Trading 
In our sampled observations, we excluded plan-wide trades from our analysis.  The 
reason is that plan-wide trades are not based on individual investors’ own decision-making, but 
because employers drop some funds from the investment menu, employees are “forced” to 
exchange all of the balance in those funds to other possible options. 
In practice, we defined plan-wide trades, only-plan-wide-trader as below. 
If a fund satisfies either of the following two conditions in a given month, then we define 
all of the trades associated with that funds in that month as plan-wide trades.  The conditions are 
1) The fund balance in a given plan is less than 2% of that in previous month. 
2) Some funds are traded in a given month by some accounts, but in that month, 
there is no balance even in plan to which those accounts belong. 
We also defined some other trading concepts associated with plan-wide trades, and treat 
plan-wide trade as below in order to generate our interest dependent variables. 
1) Only-plan-wide-trader: consider a sample trader as Only-plan-wide-trader if all of 
his/her trades within sampled 2 years are plan-wide trades.  We regard Only-plan-
wide-trader as non-trader. 
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2) Sample Trade Number: we excluded plan-wide trades, e.g, if a participants trade 10 
times, of which 3 of them are plan-wide trades during sample period, then his sample 
trade number is 7. 
3) Sample Turnover Ratio: we didn’t count plan-wide trading amount as part of the total 
trading amount, e.g, if a participant trades twice with amount of $70 and 50$, and the 
$50 trade is a plan-wide trade, given his average balance as $100, then his sample 
turnover ratio is 70% ($70/$100=70%).  
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